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In case after case, erroneous conviction 
for capital murder has been provelz. I 
contend that tlzese are not disconnected 
accidents, but systematic consequences of 
The following article is based on a paper deliv- the nature of lzomicide prosecution in 
general and capital prosecuLion in 
ered at the National Conference on Wrongful particular - Lllat ln this respect, as in 
Convictions and the Death Penalty, held at others, death distorts and undermines the 
Northwestern University Law School in the law. 
There are three factual claims behind 
Novembei: At deadline time the complete ver- the that capital convictions of 
sion was in press for 61 Law & Contemporary innocent defendants are very rare. 
problems (1998). (1) Erroneous convictions are rare in 
criminal  rosec cut ions of aizv sort, and their 
danger is greatly exaggerated. Judge 
Learned Hand captured tlzis sentiment in 
his frequently quoted observation: "Under 
our criminal procedure the accused has 
every advantage. . . . He is immune from 
question or comment on liis silence; he 
cannot be convicted when there is the least 
fair doubt in the minds of any one of the 
twelve. . . . Our dangers do not lie in too 
little tenderness to the accused. Our 
procedure has been alxvays haunted by the 
ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is 
an unreal dream. What we need to fear is 
the archaic formalism and the water>? 
sentiment that obstructs, delays, and 
defeats the prosecution of crime." 
(2) On the whole, homicides are easier 
to solve than most other violent felonies. 
Homicide is typically a crime of passion 
ra~lzer than design, and the killer is usually 
a relative, friend or acquaintance of the 
victim. For example, in 1994, about 78 
percent oi robberies and 52 percent of 
aggravated assaul~s in the United States 
were committed by strangers, compared 
with only about 25 percent of homicides. 
As a result, most l?ormcides present no real 
question about tlze ideiztily of the criminal, 
and no real nsk of misrake. 
(3) Homicides, and capital homicides in 
particular, get far more aLtenLion b a n  other 
crimes. This suggesls that errors xvill be less 
likely in these cases because thej~ are 
examined rvit1-1 much more care than 
others. For example, Franli Carrington 
wrote in 1978 " [Olur legal system 
exarnines capital convictions with such an 
incense scrutiny that . . . when there is the 
slightes~ doubt ol guilt (even after 
colzviction), a comlnuiation will usuallji 
resul~, or tlze individual \\ill otherwise be 
spared, thus lessening the chance of 
executing the innocent." 
In other words, we need not \vony 
about this problem because we have 
already taken care of it. 
How convincing are these three 
premnises? T1ze strong version of the first - 
Judge Halidk position that convictioizs of 
innocent people just don't happen - is 
false. In 1932, Edwin Borchard responded 
to the clalm that "iimocen~ men are never 
convicted" by publishing his now classic 
book, Comiicti~zg Tlze bzlzocent, in which 
he documented 65 of rlzese cases that 
never happen. Since then, several other 
compilations of proven erroneous 
cornictions have been published, and new 
cases continue to surface svit1-i regularity 
Nobody knows the true number of 
miscaken convictions. Since 1992 at least 
53 defendants - mostly convicted rapists 
- have been exonerated by DNA 
identification evidence; most of them were 
released after spending years in prison. 
These were flukes. The technology to prove 
their innocence happened to become 
available before the physical evidence from 
the crime (semen or blood) was lost or 
destroyed, or deteriorated beyond use. Itk 
anybody's guess how many other innocent 
prisoners haven't had the benefit of this 
sort of luck. The erroneous convictions that 
are discovered may truly be the tip ol an 
iceberg. 
Still, the vast majority ol convicted 
defendants are no doubt guilty; the iceberg 
- whatever its size - floa~s in a sea of 
factually correct decrsions. Learned Hand's 
view is simply an example of a common 
huinarz tendency to assimilate "usually" to 
"always," and "raroly" to "never." This can 
be dangerous. Airplane crashes (or. to 
continue a conceit. collisions bet~rieen 
ocean liners and icebergs) are also rare; as 
passengers, we can lee1 cornfortable telling 
ourselves and each other not to w o r n  that 
it wml never happen. But engineers, uabc  
controllers and pilots must no1 ignore 
crashes. These are ten-ible, tragic events, 
and they remain rare precisely because as a 
society we do u1on-y abou~ lzern. and tr)- to 
stop them from ever happening. 
The second point - that in rnost 
homicides there is no serious iac~ual 
questioiz about the guilt ol [lie accused - 
I a m  concerned with any wrongful conviction of a defendant charged with a capital crime, regardless of the crime 
or the penalty. The worst mistake, the execution of an innocent defendant, appears to be the rarest. This is what 
w e  ought to expect: Guilty or innocent, few of those who are sentenced to death in America are actually executed. 
1s tme. That reduces the field considei-abl). 
UnSortunately the ease aitli which most 
hoinicides may he solved does relatively 
little to increase [lie accuracy oi clecision- 
making in capital homicide cases, since 
that subset is likely to include 111ost of [he 
cases in which factual cletenninations are 
most difficult. In most lio~llicides the klller 
was known to the ~ i c t ~ ~ ~ l ;  that is tlie main 
fact that makes most homicides eaS>T to 
sol17e. But not capital murders. For 
example: a study ol honlicicle prosecutions 
lrom 1976 through 1980 in Georgia, 
Floncla, and Illinois found that while only 
17 percent to 22 percent of all the 
homicide ~ l c t i ~ s  in those states \arere liilled 
b>- strangers, 55 percent to 71 percent of 
the death sentences were returned 111 this 
comparati\7ely rare set of cases. 
The third step in the argument - that 
capital cases get an estraordinaiy amounr 
of attention - is also certainly true. But for 
the puipose of m i n ~ m ~ i n g  the risk ol 
erroneous con~.ictions and executions that 
attention is a t \ ~ ~ o  edged sword at best: It 
generaies many more mistakes than we 
~17oulcl see if capital murders were handled 
as casually as run-of-the-mill robbelies and 
assaults. The extra attention we devote to 
capi~al cases might also help us catch some 
or even most ol these mistakes, to the 
estent that we are comniitted to doing so. 
Uniortunatel;! recent hismi7 suggests that 
our commitment to correcting deadly 
judicial errors is weak. 
The last paragraph must seem very 
puzzling: Why \\~oulcl added altention 
increase errors? And yet, that non-intuitive 
statement 1s the core of my argument. 1 will 
develop it later, aster defining my terins 
and offering a biief discussion of the large 
\,:oluine of evidence that has accuinulatecl 
that mistake11 convictions In capital cases 
do occur on a regular basis. Finally, J \\ill 
review what we might do and what we in 
fact do to in~niinize these tragedies. 
I. Defining the issues. 
The archetypal capital case is a highly 
publicized prosecutio~z lor a hiiltal and 
gcrl-y nlurcler, in yliic1-1 the clefencla~nt is 
tned, convic~ecl, sentenced to death, and 
eventually esecu~ec!. Needless to say, most 
capital cases differ II-om [his standard in 
one or several respects. The case may 
relatively litlle publicity; the murder 
inay be relatively low on the scale of 
horror; the clelendant may plead guilty 
rather khan go to trial, in \vhicli case he 
~vill normally be sentenced to life 
imprisonment or a term ol years; if he does 
go to ti-ial he may be con~ilcted of a non- 
capital crime, or acquitted altogether; if he 
is convicted of a capital crime, he may be 
selltenced to lile impi-isonmei~t; and finally 
if he is sentenced to death, he will 
probably never be executed. 
I am concerned kvit11 any w-ongf~11 
conviction of a defendant charged mith a 
cap~lal clime, regardless ol  he crime or the 
penalty The worst mistake, the execution 
or an innocent defendant, appears to be the 
rarest. This is ~vliat we ought to expect: 
Guilty or innocent, few of those who are 
sentenced to death in America are actually 
executed. Among the knowin cases of 
\vrongful conr.lction, many more innocent 
defendants were either con~~cted  of first 
degree murder and sentenced to cleat11 but 
not executed, or convicted of first degree 
murder and sentenced to life inipiisonment; 
much smaller groups were convicted of 
second degree murder, or even man- 
slaugliter or lesser felonies, and sentenced 
to terms of years. 
A conviction can be "~m-ong" in many 
ways. It might be excessive - for example, 
if the defendant is really guilty of second 
degree inurder but was convicted of first 
degree murder; or the jury miglit have 
been right to coiiclude that the defendant 
committed the fatal act, hut wrong to reject 
a defense of insanity or self-defense; or a 
conviction that is factually accurate might 
have been obtained in violation of tlie 
clefenclantk coiistitutional rights. I'm not 
concerneel with any ol these tyipes of 
errors. I shall limit my locus to convictioizs 
ol "the wrong person," a clelendant who 
did not do the act that caused tlze death or 
deaths for which he was convicted. 
Erroneous convictions (as I have clehned 
them) inay occur disproportioiiately olten 
in capital cases for [wo types of reasons: 
(1) because of factors that are com~?zon or 
inevitable in capital prosecutions, but that 
occur in other cases as well - for instance, 
tile lac1 that the crime involves homicide, 
or that it was heavily publicized; or 
(2) because of consequences that flow fi-om 
the demand lor the clea~1-1 penalty itself. 
Some factors nv.1~ appear in both groups. 
For example, a capital case is lilzely to be 
the sort of case that would be highly 
publicized in any event, and asking Sou the 
deatli penalty is likely to malze it inoi-e so. 
If capital cases do produce erroizeous 
convictions, there are clifiereiit implications 
depending on the cause ol the erroneous 
conviction. The causes in the first group 
imply that we should be wary ol iinposin~, 
or esecuting death sentences, because 
capital cases are of the sort where 
el?-oneous coiivictions are particularly 
lilzely regardless of the sanction req~~ested 
or imposed. Abolishing the deatli penalty 
would not reduce the number of erroneous 
convictions of that type, but rather -cvould 
eliminate the worst consequei~ces ol those 
errors. The causes in the second group 
imply that the deatli penalty i~self 
undermines the accuracy of our system of 
adjudication. As Justice Fi-ankf~lrcer put it: 
"'\Vlieii life is at hazard in a trial, it 
sensa~ionalizes the whole thing allnost 
unwittingly The effect . . . [is] very bad." If 
that's true, abolislimg capital punishment 
would reduce the number of erroneous 
convictions of all sorts in those cases in 
\vl~icli we now seek the death penalty, and 
not merely limit the llann of those errors 
that do occur. 
I!. HOW often are innocent people 
sentenced to death? 
It2 ailybodyk guess how illany of the 
3,365 pilsoners on death row are innocent 
oi the nlurders for which they were 
condemned. But we are beginning to be 
able to place a lower bound on how few it 
nzay be, and 11's quite a few The major 
worli in this area is a s t ~ ~ d y  of w-oiigf~~l 
convictions in "potentially capital cases" by 
Professors Hugo Bedau a id  Michael 
Radelet. The first p~~blislied versioi~ of this 
woi-k appeared in 1987; it listed 350 such 
wrongful coi7T'Ict10ns fl-om 1900 through 
1985, including 139 death sentences ancl 
29 executio~~s. 111 1992 Professors Bedau 
and Radelet, together wit11 Constance 
Putnain, published their lindings 111 tlie 
book 111 Spite ~[Ilzizocence. By then the 
catalogue had beein extended to 416 
miscarriages of justice, from 1900 through 
1990. Some of the cases on their list are 
notolious and controversial, ivhcluding 
several of the executions: Biuno 
Hauptmann, Joe Hill, Nicola Sacco and 
Bartolomeo Vanzetti. For these cases, there 
are other writers who maintain that the 
defendant was in fact guilty But the 
precision of Bedau and Radeletk judgment 
in every case hardly matters; itk the overall 
pattern that tells the story In the great 
majority of their cases the error has been 
admitted or is beyond dispute. And even 
the disputed cases suggest that there are 
severe doubts about the defendants' guilt 
- which in turn means that many of them 
were innocent. On the other side, Bedau 
and Radelet excluded cases in which the 
defendants may well have been innocent, 
if, in their judgment, the evidence of 
innocence was not sufficiently convincing. 
In any event, a conlpilation such as this 
can only be a list of illustrations of the 
problem, not a catalogue of errors. As 
Bedau and Radelet readily admit, nobody 
knows how many miscarriages of justice 
have gone entirely undetected. 
In 1996, Professors Radelet and Bedau 
and William Lofquist published a third 
study on this issue: a compilation of cases 
of prisoners who were released from death 
row since 1970 because of serious doubts 
about their guilt. They list 69 such cases, 
about 1.2 percent of the total number of 
death sentences returned between the end 
of 1972 and the beginning of 1998. As the 
authors point out, their definition of the 
categoiy - "serious doubts about guilt" - 
includes some death row inmates who 
were ultimately acquitted, or whose cases 
were dismissed, but who may in fact have 
been guilty Nonetheless, it is almost 
certainly an undercount of the number of 
defendants erroneously convicted and sent 
to death row, for several reasons: (1) In 
some of these cases - the most tragc - 
the error will never be discovered and the 
defendant will be executed or die in prison 
of other causes. (2) In others the error will 
probably never be discovered because it 
has become moot. The published list does 
not include any case in which a defendant 
who might well be innocent obtained 
release on other grounds, such as a 
constitutional violation, or the death or 
absence of a witness. (3) In some cases 
errors that will eventually be discovered are 
not yet lznown. The average time to release 
for the cases that Radelet and his colleagues 
list is 7.34 years; the median time is 
between six and seven years. The death- 
row population in the United States has 
been growing steadily for decades; as a 
result, many prisoners on death row have 
been there six years or less. (4) Some cases 
in which innocent death row prisoners 
have been released - perhaps most - are 
not in the sample. Over a quarter of the 
total number of cases (18168) are from 
Florida; California, which has the largest 
death row in the country - 477 compared 
to 389 in Florida - has only two cases; 
and Texas, which has executed more 
prisoners than any other state - 144 
compared to 39 for Florida - has only six. 
The reason for th~s  disproportion, as the 
authors point out, is that Professor Radelet 
works in Florida and has maintained 
detailed data on every capital prosecution 
in the state. If there were comparable data 
for all death penalty states, or if there was a 
comprehensive registry of all death row 
inmates released because of doubts about 
guilt, the total of known cases would be 
much higher. But these resources do not 
exist. 
The essential thing to know about 
mistaken convictions in capital cases is that 
they do happen and will continue to 
happen with some regularity - as Bedau 
and Radelet halie shown. Bedau and 
Radelet do not try to estimate how often 
these tragic mistakes occur, and neither 
will I. Instead, I nil1 address a related issue: 
Why do thej~ happen in death penalty 
cases? 
At the outset, however, it may be useful 
to put the numbers I have provided in 
perspective. Bedau and Radelet have 
assembled information on more erroneous 
conviclions in capital cases in Amelica in 
this century than all other collections of 
such errors in all criminal cases combined. 
Since then, similar errors keep coining to 
light. In 1988, Arye Rattner published the 
most con~prehensive summaiy of 
information on known miscarriages of 
justice in Amenca, regardless of crime or 
cause - 205 erroneous conrictions, from 
1900 on. In 45 percent of Rattnerk cases 
the offense was murder, and in 12 percent 
the penalty was death. B>7 compaiison, 
homicides (of all sorts) make up a iraction 
of 1 percent of all arrests in this country, 
and about 3 percent of arrests for crimes of 
violence. Murder and 11011-negligent 
homicide account for 1.3 percent of all 
criminal convictions, about 7 percent of 
convictions for violent crimes, less than 3 
percent of all commitments to prison, and 
about 10 percent of commitments to 
prison for crimes of violence. Death 
sentences account for about 2 percent ol all 
murder convictions, less than two-tenths of 
1 percent of all convictions for violent 
crimes, and perhaps three hundredths of 1 
percent of all criminal convictions. In other 
words, capital cases are heavily over- 
represented among known miscarriages of 
justice - 5 to 1 or 10 to 1 or 100 to 1 or 
more, depending on which comparison 
seems most telling. 
Does this mean that miscarriages of 
justice are more likely in capital cases than 
other prosecutions? I think so, for reasons I 
will explain in the next section. But there is 
also an obvious competing explanation lor 
this striking d~sproportioi~. Since we pay 
more attention to lzomicides than to other 
crimes, and more to capital cases than to 
other homicides, we would be liliely to 
detect more errors among homicide 
convictions than among otlzer felonies - 
and especially among the most aggravated 
homicides - even if the errors that occur 
were evenly distributed. In part, this 
argument is certainly true. With more effort 
we could discover more miscarriages of 
justice, and we do devote more attention to 
capital cases than to other felony 
prosecutions. But it cannot be a complete 
explanation for tlhe apparent abundance of 
errors in capital cases. Many of the known 
miscarriages of justice - capital and uon- 
capital alike - were discovered by sheer 
chance. If chance were the only factor, the 
known cases would be representative oi all 
ei~oi-s; since it3 only one causal factor, the 
sample is no doubt quite different from the 
universe. Still, if even a third of the errors 
suriaced by luck alone, it would be 
surprising if the actual proportion of errors 
in murder cases were over-represented in 
the set of lznown errors by as large a factor 
as we see: live or ten or a hundred to one. 
Ultimately, the comparative proportion 
of miscarriages of justice in capital cases 
does not matter. ICs possible, I suppose. 
Liwci QUADRANGLE NOTES SPRING 1999 85 
that erroneous convictions are just as 
common in other criminal cases. It's a 
depressing thought. It implies that behind 
the seventy some prisoners who have been 
released from death rowT in recent years 
because of doubts about their guilt there 
are thousands of undiscovered cases of 
defendants uith equally doubtful 
convictions for non-capital homicides, and 
dozens of thousands or more equally 
questionable convictions for robbery, 
burglar)! and assault. But even if we 
assume this unlikely equivalence, the basic 
problems would be the same. Capital cases 
are at least as error prone as any others 
(if not much more so) and we regularly 
sentence innocent people to death. So the 
underl?ing question remains: Considering 
all the attention we devote to death penalty 
cases, why do we make so many mistakes? 
Ill. Why are innocent people 
regularly sentenced to death? 
The road to conviction and sentence has 
three main stages: investigation, which is 
primarily the province of police; pre-trial 
screening and plea bargaining, where the 
dominant actor is the prosecutor; and trial, 
before a judge and jury. At each stage, 
capital cases receive more care, more 
resources and more scrutiny than other 
prosecutions. This special focus is a natural 
consequence of the unique importance of 
death - the deaths of the victims and the 
prospect of death as punishment for the 
defendants. In most cases, the effects of 
this special treatment are beneficial. But 
there's a cost: In some cases, the very same 
process produces terrible, deadly errors. 
A. Investigation. 
This is the critical stage, where most 
errors occur. The circumstances that 
produce thern are variable, but the basic 
cause is the same: Homicides, and in 
particular capital homicides, are pursued 
much more vigorously than other crimes. 
As a result, more guilty defendants are 
identified and apprehended. Unfortunately, 
along the way more innocent defendants 
- a larger number and a higher 
proportion - are caught up in the process 
as well. 
1. Clearance rates. 
Most crimes are never solved. In 1995, 
a mere 21 percent of all serious crimes 
known to the police were "cleared" - 
which usually means that a suspect was 
arrested; of serious violent crimes, 45 
percent were cleared. But e\7en these low 
figures only tell half the story. Most crimes 
are not "known to the police" - in 1995, 
only 36 percent of all crimes, and 42 
percent of crimes of violence, were 
reported. In ot'her words, only about 
18 percent of all crimes of vlolence are 
solved by the police, including about 
14 percent of robberies, 18 percent of 
rapes, and 7 percent of burglaries. 
On the whole, the crimes that are 
reported to the police have better evidence 
than those that are not reported. Cases 
with extremely strong evidence - those in 
which the culprit is caught in the act, or 
seen and identified by several people - 
are almost always reported. If the victim 
has to take the initiative to notify the 
police, he'll be more likely to do so if he 
thinks there's a good chance that the 
criminal will be caught. When the police 
do hear about a robbery, or a rape, or a 
burglary, for which the identity of the 
criminal is not immediately obvious, their 
investigation is usually perfunctory: Put out 
a call to other officers to try to spot the 
criminal in flight; interview the witnesses at 
the scene; collect immediately available 
physical evidence; that's it. If a suspect 
doesn't emerge from this process it is 
unlikely that the case will ever be 
prosecuted. Most police detectives do not 
have the time to conduct detailed 
investigations of every reported felony, and 
in the usual run-of-the-mill case there is 
litile plessure on them to do so The net 
result is that in general the felonles lhal are 
prosecuted are likely lo be those In which 
the emdence of gullt 1s strongesi 
Homicides are different First, almost 
every homicide is reporled to the pollce 
when the body of the deceased person is 
found Second, most homlcldes known LO 
the police are cleared - 65 percent in 
1995, more in prevlous years Overall, the 
proportion of all homicides that are solved 
is about four times higher than the 
comparable proportion for other molent 
cnmes A study of robbery investigations m 
Chicago in 1982-83, by Franklin Zimnng 
and James Zuehl, promdes an excellent 
illustration 13 percent of all robbenes 
reported to the police were solved wthin 
two months (including a somewhat lower 
proportion of robbenes w t h  lnjunes to the 
vlctims), compared to 57 percent of 
robbeiy killlngs This difference cannot be 
explained by supellor emdence - on the 
contrary, robbery homicides wll  usually 
have weaker emdence, since the mctim is 
dead -but must be due to a systematic 
difference in the investigation by the police 
As we have noted, many homicldes are 
easy to investigate In a typical case - a 
kllling by a fnend as a result of a drunken 
fighr - the killer is known from the start 
But the police get the hard murders as well 
as the easy ones, and theie is much more 
piessure to solve these cases than non- 
homicidal cnmes The relatives of the 
vlctim care more, the prosecutol cares 
mole, the public is much more likely to be 
concerned, and the pollce themselves care 
more Death produces strong reactions - 
m  his context, a desire to punish and to 
protect Other outrageous crimes can have 
the same effect - kldnappings, for 
example, or senal rapcs - but they are 
lare Hoinicide 1s common 
Foi the most part, the pressule to solve 
homicldes produces the intended iesults 
An lnvestlgation that would be closed 
wthout arrest if ~t were a mere robbery 
may end in a conviction if the robber killed 
one of his vlctims But that saine piessure 
can also produce mistakes II [he murder 
cannot be rcadlly solved, the pohce may be 
tempted to cut corners, to jump to 
conclusions, and - if they believe they 
have the killer - perhaps to manufacture 
evidence to clinch the case. The danger 
that the investigators will go too far is 
magnified to the extent that the killing is 
brutal and horribng, and to the extent 
that it attracts public attention - factors 
which also increase the likelihood that the 
murder will be treated as a capital case. 
The murder of l0-year-old Jeanine 
Nicarico is a good example. In February 
1983 she was abducted from her home in 
Naperville, Illinois, raped and lulled - a 
crime of stunning brutality The murder 
was the subject of a long, frustrating, 
unsuccessful investigation - a humiliating 
public failure. Thirteen months after the 
murder - and less than two weeks before 
the local prosecutor stood for reelection - 
three men were indicted: Rolando Cruz, 
Alejandro Hernandez and Stephen Buckley 
Cruz and Hernandez were convicted and 
sentenced to death; their convictions were 
reversed by the Illinois Supreme Court. 
They were convicted again, but this time 
only Cruz was sentenced to death. Again 
the convictions were reversed. Finally at 
CruzS third ttial- over 12 years after the 
murder - the case fell apart when a police 
officer admitted he had lied under oath, 
and the judge entered a judgment of 
acquittal. What seems to have happened is 
this: Under intense pressure, the police 
convinced themselves that they knew who 
lulled Jeanine Nicarico and they 
manufactured evidence to convince 
prosecutors and to use in court. If the 
criminal had taken jewelry from the 
Nicarico home rather than a child - or 
even if he had knocked out a family 
member or set the home on fire - there 
would probably have been a minimal 
investigation, no arrests, no trial, and no 
erroneous convictions. 
2 .  Evidence. 
Most miscarriages of justice are caused 
by eyewitness midentifications. In Rattner's 
sample of wrongful convictions, 52 percent 
of the errors for which the cause could be 
determined were caused by misidenti- 
fications, and other researchers concur that 
eyewitness eri-ol; is by far the most 
common cause of convictions of innocent 
defendants. On the other hand, eyewitness 
error was a factor in only 16 percent of 
Bedau and Radelet's cases of errors in 
potentially capital prosecutions - which 
suggests that among the non-murder cases 
in Rattner's sample, over 80 percent of tlhe 
errors were due to misidentifications. 
No doubt the main reason for this 
difference is the absence of a live victim in 
most hoinicides. Victims provide crucial 
identification evidence in most robberies 
and rapes, and so they make most of the 
mistakes, when mistakes are made. In the 
absence of a victim the police may have no 
eyewitness evidence, and therefore no 
room for eyewitness error. Ths is hardly an 
advantage for accuracy Many perhaps 
most eyewitness identifications of criminals 
by strangers are accurate. Frequently they 
are corroborated or lead to other evidence 
that greatly reduces the likelihood of error 
- fingerprints, stolen property reliable 
confessions, etc. In addition, for about half 
of all violent crimes eyewitness 
identifications are extremely reliable 
because the crimes were committed by 
relatives, friends, or others who are known 
to the victims. Murderers are even more 
likely to be known to their victims but that 
may not help because, in the words of the 
immortal cliche, "dead men don't talk." 
Eyewitness identifications are also very 
unco~nmon in burglary cases, but the 
upshot is different. There are very few 
erroneous convictions based on 
misidentifications, but since there are also 
few burglary prosecutions based on non- 
eyewitness evidence, there are few ei-rors of 
any sort, and few convictions. The 
clearance rate for reported burglaries is 
only 13 percent. But killers must be 
pursued, and in the absence of eyewitness 
evidence, the police are forced to rely on 
evidence from other sources: accomplices; 
jail-house snitches and other undenvorld 
figures; and confessions from the 
defendants themselves. Not surprisingly, 
perjuly by a prosecution witness is the 
leading cause of error in erroneous capiral 
convictions, and false confessions are the 
third most common cause. 
Peijuty. From Macbeth to Mark Twain's 
Injun Joe, the killer who blames his crime 
on others is a familiar character in liction. 
Similar things happen in life. Some 
criminals iinplicate innocent defendants in 
order to divert suspicion from themselves. 
In other cases, false nrltnesses, who may 
have had no role in the crime, lie for 
money or for other favors. Both types of 
motives are more powerful in homicides 
than in other climinal cases, and especially 
in capital homicides. 
First, the threat of being caught is much 
greater for a homicide than for almost anjJ 
other crime. It's no news that the police 
work much harder to find killers than 
burglars or robbers, and that their interest 
increases in proportion to the brutality and 
notoriety of the crime. 
Second, if the culprit is suspected and 
caught, he has more to fear in a capital 
case. He might get esecuted. The threat of 
death can be a powerful motivator when 
it's concrete. The death penalty as an 
abstract prospect does not seem to deter 
many homicides. Before the crime, the 
killer - if he thinks at all - no doubt 
expects to escape scot-free; he is not likely 
to weigh the benefits of murder against the 
costs of the possible punishment. After the 
crime, however, there is more time to 
think, and the fear of conviction and 
execution may be vivid - especially if the 
police seem to be closlizg in. 
Third, a pe junous  killer may have to 
admit to crimes himself. He and the 
innocent defendant may in fact have been 
accomplices in some crime other than the 
murder, or he might have been caught in 
undeniably compromising circumstances, 
or he might have to admit to some level of 
guilt in order to make his accusation 
credible. If so, the real killer has more to 
gain in a capital case than under other 
circuinstances. If he has to go to prison, 
the gain from cooperation is tiine vs. death, 
as opposed to less time vs. more tiine. But 
that may not be necessary: If he helps 
break a capital case, he may walk. 
Fourth, if the witness is lying to get 
favors unrelated to the criine at issue, he'll 
do much better if it's a big case - whlch 
usually means a murder, or better yet, a 
capital murder. The typical witness in this 
categoiy is the jail-house snitch. For 
example. in 1932 Gus Colin Langley was 
con~icted of fil-st degree murder in North 
Carolina based in part on testimonj~ from 
his cellmate, who said that Langley had 
confessed to him. Langley came within half 
an hour of electrocution, but was 
esonerated four years later and received a 
full pardon. His cellmate didn't have to 
wait that long; after his pe jurious 
testimony, unrelated charges against him 
were dropped. 
Fifth, it's easier to lie about a capital case 
than most other cnmes of violence: therek 
usually no live vlctim to contradic~ the false 
witness. 
The overall result seems to be that 
witness perjury is a far more common 
cause of error in murders and other capital 
cases than in lesser crimes. Bedau and 
Radelet identified it as a factor in 35 percent 
of their erroneous capital convictions, 
while Rattner lists perjury as the cause of 
only 11 percent of his errors. But recall that 
45 percent of Rattner's cases are murders. If 
pe jury  were as common among the 
murder convictions in Rattner's sample as 
among Bedau and Radelet's cases, then 
erroneous murder convictions could easily 
account for all the cases in which the error 
was caused by perjury. 
The case of Paris Calriger is a good 
illustration of the role of pe rjuiy in capital 
prosecutions. On March 14, 1978, Camger 
was arrested for the bi-utal robbery murder 
of Robert Shabv, the owner of a jewelry 
store, on the previous day The evidence 
against Cariiger was provided by Robert 
Dunbar, a friend on whose property 
Camger was living in a trailer. Dunbar - 
who had a great deal of experience as a 
police informant - called the police and 
said he could identify Shaw's killer in 
return for immunity froin prosecution lor 
various felonies: another robbery he 
committed two days earlier, possession of a 
gun he had bought (which was illegal 
because he was a convicted felon), and 
attempting to dispose of the proceeds of 
the Shaw robbery-murder. The police 
agreed to ihese terms. Dunbar then told 
thein that Carriger had come to him, 
confessed to the lulling, and asked for help 
in disposing of bloody clothes and stolen 
jewelry; Dunbar corroborated the story by 
producing some ol the loot, and leading 
the police to some of the cloihes. Camger 
was convicted and sentenced to death 
almost entirely on Dunbar's testimony He 
steadfastly maintained his innocence, and 
claimed that Dunbar himself - a man 
with a long history of violence and 
deception - must have committed the 
murder. After the trial, Dunbar, who was 
soon jailed for other crimes, bragged that 
he had framed Carrigei-. In 1987 he 
confessed his own guilt to various people, 
including his parents and a clergyman. 
That same year he repeated his confession 
in court, and admitted that he had lied at 
Camger's trial and that he had committed 
the murder himself. Three weeks later he 
retracted that confession, but admitted that 
he was doing so for fear that he'd be 
prosecuted for the murder and executed 
himself. In 1991, shortly before he died in 
prison, Dunbar confessed again, to his 
cellmate. Dunbar's es-wife, who had 
corroborated his original story and had 
given him an alibi, testified in 1987 that 
Dunbar had forced her to lie. 
In December 1997, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals en banc ordered that 
Carriger be retried or released. As of this 
writing, he remains in custody awaiting 
retrial. He came close to execution on 
several occasions in the 20 years since his 
arrest. Under the circumstances, a new trial 
seems a modest goal, since, at a minimum, 
the evidence that has turned up after tilal 
raises grave doubts about Carriger's guilt. 
But if Robert Shaw hadn't been killed, none 
of this would ever have happened. Dunbar 
would probably never have approached the 
police, they would hardly have given an 
ex-felon immunity from prosecution for 
three serious felonies in order to convict 
someone else of a single robbery, and the 
victim would have been available to 
contradict a false story 
False confrssioi~s. A typical robbery 
investigation is resolved by an eyewitness 
identifica~ion; a typical homicide 
investigation is resolved by a confession. 
Many confessions are easy straight-forward 
affairs - volunteered by suspects who are 
overcome by guilt, or believe they have 
nothing to lose. These are  he easy cases, 
where nothing has been clone that i~zight 
produce a false coi-~fessioiz, and where 
mole often ~ h a n  ot theie is stlong 
coiloborating evldence of gull[ Some 
coiifessions, however, are not so readily 
given, but ale instead the end products of 
long, drawn out interrogations 
Ameiican police oificels use all soits of 
coercive and manipulative methods to 
obtain coiifesslons They confuse and 
disonent the suspect, they lie to hlm about 
physical evldence, about wtnesses, about 
statements by other suspects, they pretend 
that they already have thelr case sealed and 
ale only givlng the suspect a chance to 
explain his side of the story, they pretend 
to understand, to sympathize, to excuse, 
they play on the suspect's fears, hls biases, 
his guilt, his loyalty to family and fnends, 
his rehglon, they exhaust the suspect and 
wear him down, 111 some cases, they use 
molence, even toltule These are powerful 
techniques They work to get confessions 
from gullty defendants - and sometimes 
from innocent defendants as well 
From the pomt of mew of the police, 
the inain problem w ~ h  inLerrogatioil is not 
that it occasionally pioduces errors, but 
that ~ t k  extremely time consuming It's 
likely to take hours, peihaps days to break 
down a suspect who resists and inslsts on 
111s innocence Frequently several police 
ofhccrs cooperate in the effort, ques~ioiiing 
the suspect simultaneously or in relays As 
a result, extended interrogation is largely 
iesenred for big cases in whlch confessions 
are necessaiy for successful prosecution 
Tjrpically, [hat means homlcidcs, and 
especially the nios~ heinous homicides, for 
reasons Itre mentioned thcse are the cases 
that the pollce are most annous to solve, 
and yet, because the vlctim is dead, they 
frequently lack cycmiltnesses 
As bmth pequry, false confessioiis ale a 
much more common cause of elrors foi 
homicides than for other cnmes They 
weie a cause of 14 pelcent of Bedau and 
Radelet's errors in homiclde and capltal 
cases, but only 8 perccnt of the errors 
reported by Rat~ner Slnce 45 pelcent of 
Rattnel's cases arc homicides, this suggests 
that false confessions are three to four 
times more common as a cause of 
mlscaiiiages of justice for homicide cases 
than foi oiher cnmcs 
The case of Melvin Reynolds is a good 
example, but by no means unique. On 
May 26, 1978, 4-year-old Eric Christgen 
disappeared in downtown St. Joseph, 
Missouii. His body later turned up along 
the Missouri fiver; he had been sexually 
abused and died or suffocation. The police 
questioned over a hundred possible 
suspects, including "every known pervert 
in town," to no avail. One of them was 
Melvin Reynolds, a 25-year-old man of 
limited intelligence who had been sexually 
abused himself as a child and who had 
some homosexual episodes as an 
adolescent. Reynolds, although extremely 
agitated by the investigation, cooperated 
through several interrogations over a 
period of months, including two polygraph 
examinations and one interrogation under 
hypnosis. In December 1978 he was 
questioned under sodium amytal ("truth 
serum") and made an ambiguous remark 
that intensified police suspicion. T~vo 
months later, in February 1979, the police 
brought the still cooperative Reynolds in 
for another round of interrogation - 14 
hours of questions, promises and threats. 
Finally, Reynolds gave in and said, "1'11 say 
so if you want me to." In the weeks that 
followed, Reynolds embellished this 
confession with details that were fed to 
him, deliberately or othenvise. That was 
enough to convince the prosecutor to 
charge Reynolds, and to convince a jury to 
convict him of second degree murder. He 
was sentenced to life imprisonmenL. Four 
years later, Reynolds was released when 
another man - Charles Hatcher - 
confessed to three murders, including tliat 
of Eiic Christgen. 
0. Pre-Trial Screening 
Most prosecutions are resolved without 
tiial. Eighty to 90 percent of convictions 
result from guilty pleas, usually after plea 
bargains, and at least 80 percent of 
defendants who are not convicted obtain 
pre-tiial dismissals rather than acquittals. 
In otliei- words, most of the work of sorting 
criminal cases after arrest is done pre-trial, 
by the exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
to dismiss, to reduce charges, or to 
recommend or agree to a particular 
sentence. This pre-trial screening is 
undoubtedly less important than the initial 
police investigation, but il has more impact 
on the accuracy of ciiminal dispositions 
than anything that happens later on. If (he 
wrong person has been arrested, this is 
where the mistake is most likely to be 
caught. But in capital cases the value or 
that screening is undermined, in part by 
the effect of the threat of the death penalty 
and in part by the attention and pressure 
that capital cases generate. As a result, there 
is a danger of two distinct types of errors. 
1. Guilty pleas by innocent defendants. 
Threat is an essential part of all plea 
bargaining: Take the deal or you'll do 
worse after conviction. There is, 
undeniably, a coercive aspect to thls 
bargain - the defendant must risk a severe 
penalty in order to exercise his right to trial 
- and plea bargaining has been strongly 
criticized on that ground. One attack is 
that the threat is so effective that it drives 
sonie innocent defendants to plead guilty 
along with the mass of guilty ones. That 
may happen with some regularity for 
innocent defendants who are offered very 
light deals: time-served, diversion, six 
months unsupervised probation, and so 
forth. But among the more serious criminal 
con~ictions with severe penalties of 
imprisonment or death - those 
convictions that show up in cases of 
proven miscarriages of justice - the 
picture is different. I have located exactly 
one reported miscamage of justice based 
on a gullty plea for a non-homicidal cri~ne 
- and tliar was a peculiar case, a 
defendant who pled guilty to a criine he 
did not commit along with one which he 
did commit. The available collections of 
known errors are hardly representative 
samples oi the universe of erroneous 
convictions, and ei-rors based on guilty 
pleas are undoubtedly less likely to be 
discovered than those based on trials. Even 
so, this is a stark contrast to the 
ovenvhelmiiig proportion of all conrictions 
that are based on guilty pleas. 
Judging fro~n the available e~ridence, 
innocent defenclanls rarely plead guilty 
when doing so entails a substantial t e t~n  of 
imprisoumeni, except in capital 
prosecutions. Radelet, Bedau and Putna~n 
list 16 cases of innocent lzo~nicide 
defendants who pled guilty; in most, fear 
of execution is given explicitly as the 
reason for the plea. This is, no doubt, 
another illustration of hoar deach is 
different. It seems that innocent defendants 
will almost always risk additional years of 
their lives in order to seek vindication 
I-ather than accept disgrace coupled with a 
long tern1 of imprisonment, but some will 
not go so far as to risk death. 
The case of John Sosnovske is a good 
example. In 1990, he was falsely 
implicated in the rape murder of Tauizja 
Bennett by his g r l  friend, Laverne Pavlinac, 
who apparently was afraid of hiin and 
anxious to be lid of him. In the process, 
Pavlinac became entangled in her own lies, 
and claimed to have participated in the 
killing. Both were charged with murder. 
Pavlinac recanted her confession but was 
convicted and sentenced to life in prison. 
Following her conviction, Sosnovske - 
who was facing the death penalty - pled 
no contest and was also sentenced to life 
imprisonment. Both were freed in 1995 
alter another man, Keith Hunter Jesperson, 
confessed and also pled guilty to the same 
murder. 
2. Failure to dismiss false charges. 
The major filter that may prevent a 
charge based on questionable evidence 
from turning into a conviction is 
pi-osecutorial discretion to dismiss. Overall, 
dismissals of felony charges outnumber 
acquittals about 4 to 1. Many cases are 
dismissed because of weak evidence 
despite the fact that the prosecutor is 
convinced that the defendant is guilty; 
other cases are dismissed because the 
prosecutor is convinced of the defendant's 
innocence, or has at least come to doubt 
his guilt. For homicides, and especially 
capi~al homicides, both sorts of dismissals 
are less likely. In both situations, the major 
reason is the same: We devote more 
attention and more resources to criininal 
cases when death is at stake. 
Trials are time consuming and 
expensive; they are a scarce resource. Since 
most cases cannot be tried, it is obviously 
sensible for a prosecutor to t q 7  to restrict 
t~ials to cases where the outcomes will be 
useful - i.e., convictions. If possible, a 
likely loss at trial nil1 be avoided through 
generous plea bargaining; if  not, the case 
may be dismissed even if the prosecutor is 
convinced oi the defendant's guilt. Regard- 
less of their belief in the defendants' guilt, 
prosecutors focus on the easiest cases first 
- the ones with the best evidence - since 
those are the cases where their limited 
resources will have the greatest impact. 
But homicides are different. Homicides 
(and other notorious crimes) are the cases 
for which resources are consewed. A dead 
loser will still be dismissed, but what if it's 
merely likely that the defendant will be 
acquitted? If it's a robbery, the prosecutor 
may dump the case and try another; if it's a 
murder, she's more likely to forge ahead. 
Prosecutors lose a much higher 
proportion of murder trials than other 
felony trials, about 30 percent vs. about 15 
percent. As Robert Scott and William 
Stuntz point out, the most likely 
explanation is that in murder cases they are 
willing to go to trial with comparatively 
weak evidence. The main effect of this 
extra effort is that guilty defendants are 
convicted who otherwise would never be 
tried. But in some cases the evidence is 
weak because the defendants are not guilty, 
and some of those innocent defendants are 
not only tned but convicted. In other 
words (as with police investigations), as 
prosecutors work to obtain convictions in 
hard homicide cases they draw in cases 
where it's difficult to separate the innocent 
from the guilty 
Prosecutors also disiniss charges in 
some cases because they believe the 
defendant may be innocent, regardless of 
the evidence that is available to obtain a 
conviction. The rules of professional 
responsibility allow a prosecutor to 
consider her own view of the defendant's 
guilt in deciding whether to charge, but do 
not require her to do so. Prosecutors have 
widely varying views on how to apply this 
vague standard, from those who say that 
they will never prosecute unless they 
themselves are convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, 
to those who believe that regardless of their 
own uncertainty their task is to make a 
case and let the jury decide. But this is 
always a discretionary choice, and 
whatever the prosecutor's position in the 
abstract, an actual decision to disiniss a 
serious charge that would probably have 
resulted in a conviction is always difficult. 
It is bound to be much more difficult - 
and unlikely - if the crime has attracted a 
lot of attention, or if a victim, or several, 
were killed. 
The problem is not just public pressure. 
Evidence of a defendant's innocence does 
not arrive on the prosecutor's door step on 
its own. If the police didn't find it at an 
earlier stage, it is usually presented by the 
defendant's attorneys. Everybody agrees 
that innocent defendants should not be 
charged or convicled; the trouble is 
identifying the cases in which that applies. 
If there happens to be overwhelming 
independent evidence of innocence, there 
is no problem. But if the evidence of the 
defendant's innocence is not so clear, or if 
its significance is not obvious, the 
defendant's fate may hinge on the 
prosecutor's willingness to listen with an 
open mind. The more notorious the case, 
the more difficult that may be. Prosecutors, 
like the rest of us, have a harder time 
recognizing an error the more publicly they 
have endorsed it, and the more time and 
money and prestige they have committed 
to it. 
A prosecutor can always discount the 
defense attorney's claim that her client is 
innocent: This is hardly a non-partisan 
source. An attorney for an innocent 
defendant must overcome this handicap in 
any case; in capital cases it may be 
insurmountable. In an ordinary criminal 
case, most pretrial contact between the 
prosecutor and the defense attorney takes 
place in the context of plea bargaining. But 
in many capital cases - especially those 
most likely to produce death sentences - 
there is no plea bargaining. The prosecutor 
knows from the start that she will insist on 
the death penalty, so there is nothing to 
bargain over. In the absence of plea 
bargaining, there will be fewer open 
channels of communication between the 
defense and the prosecution, so it may be 
harder for the defense attorney to get a 
serious hearing. Worse, in that context, the 
true value of a claim of innocence becomes 
harder to interpret. When plea bargaining 
is an option, a defense lawyer is not likely 
to commit her credibility to the argument 
"He didn't do it" unless the lawyer believes 
that it's true, since (quite apart from 
possible effects on her reputation) taking 
that position will undermine her ability to 
do juries spot innocent defendants that the 
prosecutors have missed? Unfortunately, 
juries approach this task with two severe 
handicaps: They have less information than 
the prosecutors or the police, and they 
have essentially no e'xperience. Given these 
limitations, it is unrealistic to esFect juries 
to systematically correct errors in the 
earlier decisions to investigate, to arrest and 
to prosecute. 
This is bad news for homicide 
defendants. Whether it's because 
prosecutors take weaker cases to tiial or 
because they insist on the maximum 
penalty, homicide defendants are more 
likely to face juries than other criminal 
defendants. For example, in 1988, 33 
percent of murder cases in the 75 largest 
counties in the United States went to trial, 
compared to 5 percent of all felony 
prosecutions and 9 percent of all violent 
felonies. In 1994, 15 percent of robbery 
convictions across the country were 
obtained at trials, of which 10 percent were 
jury trials, while 42 percent of murder 
convictions were after trial, including 35 
percent that went to jury trial. In other 
words, since pre-trial sorting does less to 
winnow homicide cases than other 
prosecutions, homicide defendants are more 
likely to face the chancy ordeal of trial. 
1 don't mean to say that the institution 
of trial by jury does not help reduce the 
incidence of erroneous convictions. It no 
doubt does fill that function, but by brute 
force: by making it more difficult for the 
prosecution to obtain any convictions, and 
by discouraging trials of the guilty and the 
innocent alike unless the evidence of guilt 
is very strong. The main benefit of this 
process is that feedback from court may 
improve pre-trial investigations and 
increase selectivity in charging - the 
stages of the process we have already 
discussed. If all works well, the result is 
that few innocent defendants are brought 
to trial, most defendants who are convicted 
are guilty and most who are acquitted are 
also guilty. And yet, if an innocent 
defendant is tried, he will probably be 
convicted. 
Given this structure, trial plays a 
comparatively minor role in the production 
of errors in capital cases. To the extent that 
jury behallor at trial does matter, the 
question is: Do juries behave differently in 
homicide trials in general, and in capital 
homicides in particular, than in other 
criminal trials! There are several reasons to 
think that juries treat homicides and capital 
cases differently than other criminal cases, 
and most of them point in the direction of 
a higher likelihood of conviction. 
1. Factors that increase the likelihood 
of conviction. I 
Publicity. Most crimes, even most 
homicides, receive veiy little attention from 
the media. A few crimes, however, are 
heavily publicized. Many, perhaps most of 
these notorious crimes are homicides, and 
especially the unusual and heinous 
homicides that are most likely to be 
charged as capital crimes. In those cases, 
most jurors will have heard all sorts of 
things about the case before they got to 
court, many of them inadmissible, 
misleading, and inflammatory They may 
have seen or heard or read that police 
officers 01- other government officials have 
declared the defendant g~~i l ty  They may 
have witnessed or felt a general sense of 
communal outrage. All this will malze them 
more likely to convict. Courts may attempt 
to mitigate the impact of pre-trial publicity 
by various means - most effectively by 
changing the location of the trial - or they 
may refuse to clo so. Not surprisingly, the 
records of erroneous convictions include 
scores of cases in which publicity and 
public outrage clearly contributed to the 
error - from the convictions of Leo Frank 
in 19 13 and the Scottsboro Boys in 1931, 
to the con~~ct ions  of Rolando Cruz and 
Alejandro Hernandez in 1985. 
Death Qualgicatiotz. In capital cases, 
juries decide the sentence as well as 
determine guilt or innocence. To 
accommodate this function, the capital jury 
selection process includes a unique 
procedure, "death qualification," that is 
designed to ensure that the jury is qualified 
for the sentencing phase, hlost jurors a7ho 
are strongly opposed to the death penalty, 
and some who are strongly in favor, are 
excluded at the outset. Many studies have 
sho~ml that these exclusions produce juries 
that are more likely to convict. In addition, 
the process of questioning jurors about 
their willingness to impose the death 
penalty before the trial on gurlt or 
innocence has begun, tends to create the 
impression that guilt is a foregone 
conclusion, and the only real issue is 
punishment. 
Fear oJ Death. In a capital case, avoiding 
execution can become the overriding 
imperative for the defense. In extreme 
cases, fear of death drives innocent 
defendanls to plead guilty in return for a 
lesser sentence, even life imprisonment. If 
the defendant does not plead guilty, either 
because no plea bargain is offered or 
because he was un~villing to take it, the 
same pressure ivill be felt at trial. Fear of a 
death sentence may drive  he defense LO 
lnake tactical choices that compromise its 
position on guilt in order to improve the 
odds on penalty; in some cases,  he defense 
may virtually concede guilt and focus 
entirely on punishment; iL will certainly 
distract [he defense from the issue of guilL 
and force it to spread its resources more 
thinly This distraction might increase the 
chances of consiction even lor those capital 
defendants who are represented by skillful 
la~i3rers with adequate resources; it will be 
far more damaging for the many capital 
defenclants whose defense is shamefully 
inadequate. 
Heilzous~zess. In theory, jurors are 
supposed to separate their decision on the 
defendant's guilt from their reaction to the 
heinousness of his conduct: If the evidence 
is insufficient, they should be just as 
willing to acquit a serial murderer as a 
shoplifter. Nobody believes this. Even in 
civil trials, where the jury is asked to 
decide cases by a preponderance of the 
evidence, there are indications that juries 
(and judges) are more likely to find 
defendants liable, on identical evidence, as 
the harm to the plaintiff increases. In 
criminal trials the problem is worse, since 
the burden of persuasion is proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In a close criminal case 
the jury is supposed to release a defendant 
who is, in their opinion, probably guilty 
This is a distasteful task under any 
circumstances, but it becomes increasingly 
unpalatable - and unlikely - as we move 
up the scale from non-violent crime, to 
violent crime, to homicide, to aggravated 
grisly murder. 
2. Factors that decrease the likelihood 
of conviction. 
Quality of Dejense. Capital defendants, 
and to some extent homicide defendants in 
general, may be better represented than 
other criminal defendants. The attorneys 
who are appointed to represent them may 
be more experienced and skillful, and their 
defenders may have more resources at their 
disposal. Other things being equal, higher 
quality representation will decrease the 
likelihood of conviction, and may operate 
as a check on errors and misconduct that 
drive some innocent capital defenclants to 
trial and to conviction. 
Severity oJ the Pa~alty.  Prosecutors, 
defense attorneys, and judges widely 
believe that some jurors are more reluctant 
LO convict a defendant who might be 
execuied than one who faces a less extreme 
punishment. In Ada~qzs v. Texm (448 U.S. 
38 [1980]), the United States Supreme 
Court acknowledged this possibility and 
held that a juror could not automatically be 
excluded from sellice because of this 
reaction. To the estenl that jurors do feel 
this way, they may be less likely to convict 
in capital trials than in other hon~icides. 
3. Net effects. 
When there are forces that push in one 
direction and forces that push in the other, 
it is sometimes possible to say that they 
cancel out. Not here. The effects I lhave 
described are extremely variable. Publicity, 
death qualification, the lheinousness oi a 
homicide - each of these may make a 
critical difference in a particular case, or it 
may not. On the other side, the protective 
features of capital trials are uneven at best. 
Many capital defendants do not have 
quality representation, by any standard. 
And the anxiety that jurors may feel when 
a defendant's life is at stake will be relleved 
if a jury decides (as they may do in 
deliberations on guilt) that he will not be 
sentenced to death. With that out of the 
way, the competing rmpulse - to not free 
a man who has killed - may take over, in 
force. 
I once saw a cartoon of two men in 
black robes, obviously judges, talking in a 
hall. One says, "Some days I'm feeling good 
and everyone gets probation, and some 
days I get up on the wrong side of bed and 
I throw the book at eveiybody It  all 
balances out." In statistical terms, the 
problem is increased valiance: Since 
nobody gets the average punishment, the 
more the judge's sentences are spread out 
arbitrarily, the more of them are errors - 
and errors on one side don't balance out 
errors on the other. The same is true of 
decisions on guilt and innocence: Mistakes 
in one direction in some cases do not 
balance mistakes in the opposite direction 
in other cases. In capital trials, one 
particular type of ~nistalte - conviction of 
an innocent defendant - is ovenvhelm- 
ingly important, and the fac~ that other, 
guilty defendants get [he benefit of other 
errors is no help. If you're building a 
seawall, adding height to one part won't 
make up for cutting away at another. 
IV. Conclusion: catching errors. 
The basic conclusion is simple. The 
steady stream of errors that we see in cases 
in which defendants are sentenced to death 
is a predictable consequence of our system 
of investigating and prosecuting capital 
murder. And behind those cases, there is 
no doubt a larger group of erroneous 
convictions in capital cases in which 
defendants are not sentenced to death. But 
what about what happens after trial? 
Everybody knows that direct and collateral 
review are more painstaking for capital 
cases than for any others. Isn't it likely that 
all these mistakes are caught and corrected 
somewhere in that exacting process? The 
answer, I'm afraid is, No. At best, we could 
do an imperfect job of catching errors after 
they occur, and in many cases we don't 
really try As a result, most miscarriages of 
justice in capital cases never come to light. 
Probably the best way to figure out how 
to catch miscarriages of justice is to look at 
the cases in which we have done so. 
Judgng from the cases that are reported, 
three factors, separately or in combination. 
are usually responsible for an innocent 
defendant's exoneration: Attention, 
Confession, and Luck. 
Attention. If a defendant is sentenced to 
death, he may well get more careful and 
attentive consideration from the courts on 
rev-ie~v. hMore important, he is likely to be 
better represented on direct appeal than he 
would be othenvise, and he is likely to 
have counsel on the post-appellate 
collateral review, while most defendants 
have none. These advantages may explain 
in part the high proportion of death 
sentences among known miscarriages of 
justice. But a comparative advantage is not 
a panacea. Many death row inmates have 
inadequate representation at e17et-y level of 
review, and some have no legal assistance 
whatever for collateral review. And many 
capital defendants who are convicted in 
error are not sentenced to death, yen  likely 
most. They do not recei1.e any special 
attention from their attorneys or from the 
courts; on the contraq they might suffer 
from the perception that they've already 
received the benefit of whatever doubts 
their cases may raise. When \Valter 
what to do: stop the execution, release the prisoner. If there were some general method for identifying mistakes, 
we ~ ~ u l d n ' t  have this problem in the first place. But of course, there isn't. Instead, the errors 
that we have discovered advertise the existence of others that we've missed. 
McMillian was released after six years on It works: More cases are cleared, more throws the entire weight of detecting errors 
death row for a murder for which he had murderers are convicted. But harder cases onto the re\iewmg courts: since the 
been framed by local enforcement officials, are more likely to produce mistakes - still discovery of errors takes time, the main 
his attorney said that "only the death exceptions. no doubt. but not as rare as for burden is on the later stages of the process, 
sentence had allowed Mr. McMillian to other crimes, where the cases that are and especiaily hahcas corp~is review in the 
receive adequate representation, which prosecuted are mostly skimmed off the top. federal court. Recently, resources for post 
eventually uncovered the plot against him." Perhaps the worst mistake we might make conviction defense in capital cases have 
In truth, McMillian's post-conviction in this connection is to assume that the been cut, the bases for review in federal 
representation was not adequate, it was danger of error for homicides is as small as court have been limited, and the process of 
extraordinary If he had merely been it is for other crimes, or, worse yet, that it review has been accelerated. If a defendant 
sentenced to life imprisonment, he may is even smaller. Homicides, especially obtains evidence of his innocence late in 
mention relief, are extraordinarily high. 
Confessions. In most cases in which Perhaps these new rules will have little 
miscarriages of justice are uncovered, the discovered and the mistake is proven effect in practice. But if they do, the 
real criminal confesses to the crime. In the beyond doubt, we know what to do: stop direction of change is inevitable: Fewer 
common scenario, the true murderer is the execution, release the prisoner. If there mistakes will be caught even among those 
arrested and imprisoned for another crime were some general method for identifyng cases that remain on track to execution, 
- sometimes a similar homicide - and mistakes, we wouldn't have this problem in more innocent homicide defendants will 
confesses before trial or in prison. For the first place. But of course, there isn't. remain in prison, and more defendants will 
example, Mehin Reynolds confessed Instead, the errors that we have discovered be killed by the state in error. 
falsely under intense pressure, to the rape- advertise the existence of others that we've 
murder of a 4-year-old boy; he was missed. How often will an innocent 
released when Charles Hatcher was prisoner run into a movie producer who is 
arrested and confessed to three murders, struck by his story? What if the real killer R- Gross, the Thomas and Mabel 
including the one for w h ~ h  Reynolds was is killed in a car crash, or dies of a drug LOng Professor of Law* is a recognized 
imprisoned. Similarly, John Sosnovske and overdose, or is never arrested, or never authority on the death penalty and has written 
Laverne Pavlinac were both freed in 1995 confesses? The most the legal system can widely on the snbject. He also has published on 
after Keith Jesperson confessed to the murder do is improve the odds by providing eyewitness identification, the w e  of expert 
for which they were falsely convicted. resources to help discover and prove witnesses, and the relationship between pre- 
Luck. Getting a confession from the real errors, by considering serious claims trial bargaining and trial verdicts. A graduate 
killer is the common stroke of luck in cases whenever they are made, and by talung of Columbia  college^ he earned hisj.D. at the 
in which a miscamage of justice is caught. action even if proof of innocence is not University of  California at Berkeley. He was in 
But sometimes luck takes a different route. absolute. private practice in San Francisco and ~vorked 
The break in Randall Dale Adarns' case Attention and quality representation as an attorney with the United Famz Workers 
came when documentary film maker Errol improve an innocent defendant's chances. Union? the Knee Lega2 Defense' 
Moms ran into Adam5 by chance in 1985 They help get court hearings: they increase Offense the NAACP Legal Defense 
when Moms was doing research on visibility, which produces opportunities for and Educational Fund, lnc., and the National 
psychiatric testimony in Texas capital lucky breaks; they buy time during which ILLY Pr@kct before going into teaching. He 
prosecutions. Moms went on to produce a the true killer may confess. But these teaches in the fields of  evidence, crimina2 
movie about Adams' case, The Thin Blue assets, whatever their value, are unevenly procedure, and the usc o f  social sciences in law 
Linc, which was released in 1988; the distributed. For the most part, they are the 
m o ~ i e  drew national attention to the case special preserve of defendants who have 
and resulted in Adams' release in 1989, 12 been sentenced to death and who still face 
years after he had been sentenced to death. the possibility of execution. And even for 
The basic cause for the comparatively that restricted group this special attention 
large number of errors in capital cases is a is under fire. Executive clemency - the 
natural and laudable human impulse: We traditional backstop that was said to 
revent execution "when there is the 
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